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IN THE SUPREME COU3T 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STAT-E OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
TERRY D. LOUDEN, ) 
) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 9851 
STATEMENT OF THE K£ND OF CASE 
This is a prosecution for burgl a ry in the second 
degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury .. From a verdict of 
guilty and judgment of conviction and sentence, de-
fend ant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of judgment of con-
viction and sentence. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In makino this statement of facts the numbers in 
0 
parenthesis refer to the pertinent page numbers of 
the record. 
At about 6:00p.m. on July 28, 1962 (75) two deputy 
sheriffs of Salt Lake County, Utah, acting upon an 
"anonymous t:ip" (73,74) went to a motel in Salt Lake 
County (74,75) .. They then requested and obtained per-
mission from the motel manager to look around the 
motel room occupied by defendant (75). Said deputies 
did not have the permission of defendant (or of anyone 
who was renting said room) to enter said motel room 
(81). The deputies and the motel manager entered 
defendant's room, se,arched and found a loaded revolver 
in a bureau drawer in the room. After looking around 
the room some more they left the roon1 and waited 
outside behind a large hedge until defendant and 
Roland D. McQueen returned to the motel roo1n at 
about 6:30 p.m. (76). Thereafter the deputies went 
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up the stairs to the mote 1 room {76). One of the 
deputies had his gun drawn as they walked up the 
stairs (83). One of the deputies testified that it was 
po3sible that the defendant and his companion saw 
that deputy {who came up the stairs with his gun drawn) 
co me up the stairs {87). After looking in the room 
and observing that defendant and his companion were 
unarmed, the deputy put the gun back in its holster 
and walked into th2 room {83,84) in a very assumptive 
manner {86). When asked whether it would have done 
them any good to protest, one of the deputies testified, 
"Well, that I don't know." As the deputies were al-
ready entering the room they asked if they could come 
in and look around {85,89). The deputies did not ask 
to look around till they were in the room {89). One 
of the deputies testified that before they searched, 
they received permission to do so from defendant and 
his companion {87). Thereafter the deputiESsearched 
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defenda:1t and his companion and then they took the 
said gun from the drawer (87). During said search, 
the deputies also found a watch in a drawer and some 
crow bars in a closet (77). Said deputy sheriff's did 
not have a search warrant for any of the foregoing 
·searches (82,83,88). Nor is there any evidence that 
they had an arrest warrant or that any crime was 
committed in their presence. 
Said gun was introduced and received in evidence 
as exhi~it S-1. The watch taken from the drawer 
(same drawer as gun) was introduced and received as 
evidence as exhibit S-2 {77,97). As a result of the 
said search another watch was taken from defendant's 
person (77) and admitted in evidence as exhibit S-Z 
(97) and as the result of said search an:l of said con-
fession (79) a camera was obtained (80) and received 
in evidence' as exhibit S-4 (97). The testimony tended 
to show that the serial number on said gun (76) was 
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the same as the serial number on a box which had 
contained a gun allegedly stolen from Harmon City 
Shopping Center {64,65). 
Defendant moved to suppress as evidence the 
fruit of the foregoing search {6,8,68,71,72)but the 
court denied the motions (68, 71, 72). Defendant also 
made a motion at the trial that the court itself hear 
evidence on the issue of the illegal search and seizure 
and determine that question, before evidence thereon 
was presented to the jury (69), but the court refused 
to follow that procedure, and allowed the evidence to 
mitiell;'"- go to the jury {70). Defendant also objected 
to the admission of testimony regarding said search 
and seizure {75). 
After defendant and his companion had been 
searched {together with the room), defendant was taken 
to the Salt Lake County jail (78) where he was allegedly 
held on another charge (92,93). One of the deputies 
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testified that two days later at the jail he had a con-
versation with defendant (78,92), and that during this 
conversation, which was a general conversation in 
which the deputy intended to get a confession (92), 
defendant allegedly made a confession (79,80), and 
thereafter in the same conversation the deputy told 
defendant that if he would clear up some other offenses 
of which he was suspected, that said deputy would not 
sign a complaint against him on those n1atters (90, 
95). On August 2, 1962, three days later, the dep~ty 
sig ned a complaint against defendant for burglary 
before a judge of Salt Lake City (5) and a warrant of 
arrest was issued the same day, August 2, 1962, and 
defendant was arrested by virtue of said warrant 
on August 2, 1962 (4). 
At the trial, defendant objected to th·2 admission 
of evidence on the aforesaid alleged confession (67, 
69). Defendant contended that the confession was 
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induced by a promise of leniency (69) and that the 
court should hear and determine whether evidence 
of the alleged confession was admissable (69). 
Defendant's attorney stated his intention to call 
the defendant as a witness in the hearing before the 
court on the confession issue (68). The court however 
refused to hear and rule on the admissibility of the 
confession before letting the jury hear it (71, 72). 
At the trial a verdict of guilty was returned 
against defendant (37) and defendant was ordered con-
fined in the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate 
term as provided by law for Burglary in the Second 
Degree ( 44). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
HEAR EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF THE COMPE-
TENCY OF DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED CONFE.SSION 
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AND RULING THEREON BEFORE PERMITTING 
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED CONFESSION TO 
BE PRESENTED TO THE JUHY. 
The majority opinion written by Justice Wade in 
the case of Sate v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 F. 2d 
178 (1943) announced the rule applicable to alleged in-
voluntary confessions. In that case the court held at 
page 373: 
"We agree with the rule approved in those 
cases, that a confession is not admissible in 
evidence unless it was voluntarily made; that 
this question must be determined by the court 
from all of the evidence from both sides bear-
ing thereon; that if the court is satisfied from 
the evidence that the confession was voluntary, 
then the court admits the confession in evidence 
to the jury, together with all of the evidence on 
the question of whether it was voluntary, and the 
circumstances surrounding its being made, and 
froJ.n such evidence the jury must determine the 
weight and credibility to be given it, but may not 
determine its competency as evid en:::: e, that being 
a question for the court." 
This has been the rule follo\ved by the Su"()ren1e 
Court of Utah ever since. See State v. Ashdown, 
5 Uiah 2d 59, 269 F. 2d 726 (1956), State v. Braasch 
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119 Utah 450, 229 P. 2d 289 {1951), State v. Mares 
113 Utah 225, 192 P. 2d 861 {1948), and State v. Fraser, 
107 Utah 454, 154 P. 2d 752 { 1944). The same rule 
applies whether the volintariness of a confession 
comes in issue by virtue of abusive treatment or by 
virtue of a promise of leniency. See State v. Ashdown, 
supra. 
The reasons for the rule are set forth in the Utah 
cases deciding and dealing with it, and the rule is 
clearly a good one. One observation should be made 
here, however. In State v. Ashdown, supra, the court 
appears to have approved the rule allowing the defend-
ant, in the 'hearing before the court {in the absence of 
the jury) on the issue of the competency of a confession, 
to take the stand for the sole purpose of testifying as 
to that issue. See page 64 of that decision. The view 
that a defendant does not waive the privilege against 
self incrimination by taking the stand on the issue of 
an alleged involuntary confession only is supported 
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by the following cases: State v. Thomas, 208 La 
548, 23 So. 2d 212 {1945) Enoch v. Comm. 141 Va 411, 
126 SE 222 (1925) and Hawkins v. State 193 Miss 586, 
10 So 2d 678 (1942). See also 147 ALR 255 at page 
272. This is a good rule, and one which goes a long 
way in deterring unlawful interrogation procedures. 
In this case, although the volintariness of the 
alleged confession was properly raised by defendant 
at the trial, and although defendant's attorney pro-
posed to call defendant as a witness in the issue of 
the competancy of the alleged confession as evidence 
the court refused to hear and rule on the issue, but 
rather allowed it to go directly to the jury. 
This procedure materially predjudiced defendant, 
because it precluded the defendant from testifying 
on the issue of co1npetancy. Had the court itself 
heard his testimony, as it should have, it might well 
have ruled the entire confession incompetent. There-
fore it cannot be said that since the evidence presented 
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to the jury showed the confession to have been coln-
petant that the court merely committed a technical 
error which did not prejudice the defendant. The jury 
didn't hear all of the evidence. 
Although the deputy testified that defendant con-
fessed to the burglary before any promise of leniency 
was made, he did testify that the conversation was a 
general one and the record indicates some uncertainty 
even in his mind as to the order in which statements 
were made. The defendant should have been given an 
opportunity to present his testimony on that issue with-
out waiving his privilege against self incrimination 
and before the confession was given to the jury. 
Failure to allow him to do so, and the admission in 
evidence of the confession and exhibit S-4, obtained 
as a result thereof, constitutes prejudicial error. 
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POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED PUHSUANT TO AN UNLAW-
FUL SEARCH AND SEiZURE AN.D IN REFUSING TO 
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO THE AD-
MISSION OF SUCH IN EVIDENCE. 
The question of the admissability in a trial of 
evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful search 
and seizure has been a subject of controversy for 
many years. The prohibition against ''unreasonable 
searches and seizures'' contained in the Constitution 
of the United States, Amendment IV, and. in the Con-
stitution of Utah, Art. I, Section 14, is clear. What 
has not been so clear is what to do with evidence 
obtained in violation thereof. Much has been said 
on both sides. The Supreme Court of the United 
States announced the rule, that such evidence is 
inadmissible in federal courts, in the case of Weeks 
v. United States, 232 US 383, 58 Led 652, 34 S Ct 
341, LRA 1915 B 834, Ann Cas 1915 C 1177 (1914). 
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This rule of exclusion has received ever expanding 
application since then. Until 1961 the states were 
free to adopt or reject the exclusion rule in state 
court prosecutions for state crimes. This rule was 
formally announced in the' case of Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 US 25, 93 Led 1782, 69 S Ct 1359 (1949) which 
held that Amendment XIVof the Constitution of the 
United States did not forbid the admission of evidence 
obtained by unreasonable search and seizure in state 
court prosecutions for state crimes. 
Prior to 1961 the Supreme Court of Utah alo-;.1g with 
anum her of other states had r·ej ected the exclusion 
rule. State v. Aim e 62 Utah 476, 220 P. 704 (1923) 
and State v. Fair 10 Utah 2d 365, 353 P. 2d 615(1960). 
In 1961 the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the case of Mapp v. Ohio, 137 US 643, 6 Led 2d 
1081, 81 S Ct 1684 {1961) overruled the case of Wolf 
v. Colorado, supra, and held on constitutional 
grounds, and not just as a rule of evidence, that: 
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''We hold that all evidence obtained by 
searches and seizures in violation of the 
Constitution is by that same authority, in-
admissible in a state court." 
The court holds that the exclusion rule of Weeks 
v. United Sta~es, supra, to be "an essential part of 
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments". The 
court further said: 
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of 
privacy has been declared enforceable against 
the State through the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the, 
same sanction of exclusion as is used against the 
Federal Government." 
Thus the decision of Mapp v. Ohio has the effect 
of overruling the Utah cases of State v. Aime, supra, 
and State v. Fair, supra, and establishing in Utah the 
federal exclusion rule, the "same sanction of exclusion 
as is used against the Fed era 1 Gave rn1nent" Map"? v. 
Ohio, supra. 
Thus this court must consider the issue of unl 8 \v-
ful sea:rch and seizure in the light of the exclusion 
rules which exist in the federal courts as a minin1 un1 
sta-,1d a rd .• _ This court. can of c ours c> be as ~; t r ict or 
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lenient as it deems proper in interpreting our 
state constitutional prohibition against "unreason-
able searches and seizures" so long as it does not 
fall below the federal minimum standard. 
Defendant contends that evidence obtained as a 
' 
result of an unlawful search and seizure, in violation 
of both state and federal Constitutions, was received 
in evidence against him and that prej udi<ial error 
was thereby committed. 
The deputies admitted that when they first 
entered the motel room they had no permission from 
defendant or anyone who was renting the room. The 
entry was a trespass and the search obviously un-
reasonable and unlawful. 
The question remains, however, as to whether this 
unlawful search taints the second search which took 
pla-:e about thirty minutes later when defendant was 
in his room. The a·:1swer is that it does -- both on 
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principle and federal decision. 
The case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United 
States 251 US 385, 64 L ed 319, 40 S Ct 182, 24 ALR 
1426 (1920) is a case where federal officials without 
authority unlawfully seized certain books and other 
papers. Based on information thus obtained a new 
indictment was framed. The items were returned 
after copies had been ma::le and subpoenas issued to 
pro::luce the originals. Plaintiff's in error refused, 
the court ordered compliance which was still refused. 
Contempt was adjudged and plaintiffs in error appealed 
The Supreme Court there held in an opinion by Justice 
Holmes, that to allow such a use of illegally obtained 
evidence "reduces the 4th Amen::lm ent to a form of 
words". The court further held: 
''The essence of a pro vis ion forbidding the 
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that 
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be 
used before the court, but that it shall not be 
used at all. Of course this does not mean that 
the facts thus obtained become sacred and 
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and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is 
gained from an independent source they may 
be proved like any others,. but the knowledge 
gained by the government's own wrong cannot 
be used by it in the way proposed." 
Mapp v. Ohio, supra, cites with approval, at 
least three times, Silverthorne Lum her Co. v. 
United States, supra. It is thus clearly the present 
law on the question and is controlling in this cas~. 
In the Silverthorne Case, supra, it was held that 
after an illegal search and seizure the government 
couldn't thereafter get the books and papers by law-
ful means {subpoena). Thus in the instant case, even 
if the deputies had returned with a proper search 
warrant, after their illegal search, they could not 
have seized the items of which they obtained know-
ledge during the unlawful search. 
Under the Silverthorne case, supra, whatever 
facts were gained by the illegal search are not 
"sac red and inaccessible''. but they can be proved 
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only g knowledge of them is gained from an "in-
dependent source". To hold otherwise would open 
the door to peace officers searching in secret, just 
like a burglar, but without taking the hazards of a 
burglar, because done without the interference of 
other peace officers. Then having found something 
incriminating as the result of such a "fishing ex-
peditio>"l" return with a search warrant to make the 
whole thing legal. Past experience has shown that 
the possibility of an independent action for dam ages 
against a peace officer for such a trespass is not 
effective as a deterrent. If con vic ted, how is a de-
fendant to finance such legal action from the peniten·· 
tiary when he does not have funds to hire counsel to 
represent him in the criminal proceedings and must 
have counsel appointed for him by the court, as in 
this case. 
It cannot be said that the gun and other iten1 s 
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·were obtained from an "independent source". The 
second search was really just an extension of the 
first. Even assuming defendant gave the deputies 
per!"!lission to look around, it was given without 
knowledge of the illegal search. Had defendant 
been informed of the illegal search and that as a 
result the deputies could not get a search warrant 
(under the Silverthorne case, supra) defendant un-
doubted ly would not have allowed the search. De-
fendant cannot be said to have waived his rights 
arising from the illegal search and seizure without 
having been informed thereof. There can be no 
waiver without knowledge. 
The foregoing arguments are particularly true 
in the light of the attitude of the deputies. They were 
"assumptive'' and just walked into the room askino 
0 
permission on their way, and this after having just 
had a gun drawn which defendant might have seen 
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according to the testimo:1y. These facts alone 
should render the entire search and seizure 
illegal as constituting an implied coercion and thus 
rendering invalid any "consent" by the defendant. 
There is no waiver of an illegal search and seizure 
made under an implied coercion and the Supreme 
Court of the United States has so held, Amos v. 
United States 255 US 313, 41 S Ct 266, 65 L ed 654 
(1921). 
The admission in evidence of exhibits S-1, 
S-2, S-3 and S-4 and of testimony regarding the 
illegal search and seizure constitutes prejudicial 
error. 
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POINT 3 
tZ/ 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSll~G TO HE 11EVIDENCE 
AND R ON THE ISSUE OF THE CONPETENCY AND r1ISSIBILITY 
OF EVI NCE OF AN ALLEGED UNLA\~UL SEARCH SEIZURE 
BEFORE HTTING EVillENCE, ALlEGEDLY OBT NED AS THE 
RESULT T. REOF, TO BE PRESENTED TO THE J Y. 
was raised by 
issue of an illegal sear and seizure 
defendanj{f~~~l't ~ should have heard .ei/ 
e absence of the jury 
competency thereof. 
Dafendant should have een B rmi tted to testi~J on 
ol /"CG . I 
this issue/without wai v · g his pri viledge against self 
incrimination. 
search and sei~ure, then the evi nee should have been 
pre sen ted to t 
Height and cr dibili ty to be given to t. This 
situation invoi ing a confession 
So long as this 
the e elusion rule, the question of how to tre t such 
Now that we have 
a, the court should clearly announce the rule 
follol-ted in these situations, and upon principal 
expedi 
, ~a matter should be 
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In cases such as the instant case, ':i!ero an issue 
of unlaHful search and seizure and of involuntary confes-
sion arise, the court could hear the evidence on both 
at the same time and in the absence of the jur,y. 
3 
POINT .if 
THE TRIAL COD"RT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO TH& 
JE)Y DEFENDANT•S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
As stated in Startin v •. 11adsen, 120 Utah 631, 
237 P. 2d 834 (1951) the court has the duty n to 
cover the theories of both parties in his instruc·tions. 11 
In this case the essence of defendant's requested 
instructions) to 7 was a request for a specific instruction 
on the confession issue. Although the. request may have 
been technicallY excessive in the light of State v. 
Ashdown, supra, and State v. Braasch, supra, never-
theless, the court, in accordance with too spirit 
of the requests,shotud have given a specific instruction 
on the issue of the confession in tenns like or similar 
to those contained in the instruction approved by this 
court in State v. Ashdot~, supra, at pages 66 and 67 
the reo: 
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The failure to give such an instruction constitutes 
prejudicial error. 
CONCLUSION 
Prejudical error was committed in the trial of 
defendant as herein set out, and the judgment and sentence 
of the trial court should be reversed. 
RespectfullY submitted, 
Robert c. Ctmmdngs 
705 utah Savings Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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